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loping New 
D
espite the spending of hundreds of millions 
of dollars on high-tech research over the 
last few years, local humanitarian deminers 
still use traditional prodders and metal detectors. The 
biggest recent technical innovation has been mechani-
cal vegetation clearance which was mostly developed 
in the field and bypassed the research route. 
An understanding of technology choice makes 
it clear why this has happened and can help us avoid 
following too many dead-ends in the future. Research 
should generate viable new options, and technology 
choice then helps select which one to use. However, 
the cri tical word is viable. Innovations that are very 
expensive, risky, hard to fit into existing work prac-
tices or that do not address high priority problems 
are not viable. If the innovation process is not driven 
by potential users bur is instead controlled by distant 
outsiders it will usually be fruitless. An experienced 
field practitioner always has as much to offer as the 
expert in the laboratory; it is the combination that is 
most productive. In humanitarian demining research 
such a combination is rarely found . 
The Developmem Technology Unit (DTU) in 
the School of Engineering at Warwick University has 
a methodological approach to humanitarian 
demining research. After 12 years of active research 
in appropriate and sus tainable technology with 
project parmers in I 0 developing countries, new work 
is based on what has been learned about the types of 
technology that really promote development and are 
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suitable for use in these countries In all its humani-
tarian demining research, contact with organizations 
in rhe field and visi ts to mined areas are used to keep 
the end user as an importam partner in the whole 
process of engineering R&D. This keeps the focus on 
types of technology that actually work in the field and 
that deminers really want, though of course it does 
nor mea n chat every idea is successful. As parr of a 
university noted for irs excellence in high-technology 
research and engineering, the OTU takes full advan-
tage of access to information and expertise in a wide 
range of technical disciplines. 
To dare, much of the DTU humanitarian 
demining program has focused on the development 
of equipment that can be produced in heavily mined 
countries. An independent British charity, the Devel-
opment Technology Workshop (DTW) has been es-
tablished to undertake much of the technology trans-
fer work; one notable success has been helping local 
people establish the Cambodian Oemining Work-
shop (COW) in Phnom Penh. The C OW is a Cam-
bodian small business that now employs 23 local 
people, 60 percent of them with disabilities and half 
of them women. The COW products are prodders, 
visors, protective clothing and other demining equip-
ment. Similar small-scale production can easily bees-
tablished in other heavily mined countries where 
there is demand, the technologies used are all trans-
ferable. The COW and DTW between them also 
manufacture (in Britain and Cambodia) the "Tern-
pest" vegetation mini-flai ls-these radio-controlled 
machines weigh two tons and three are currenrly 
working with demining NGOs in Bosnia and Cam-
bodia. 
Technology choice often involves comparing 
high-tech, imported equipment to traditional locally 
made alternatives rhar are nor as fast, but are much 
cheaper. In humanitarian demining the choice has to 
be between differem speeds and costs and not just 
differem levels of safety. Using less safe equipment 
just because it is cheaper has effectively been ruled 
our as there is an over-riding requirement to protect 
professional deminers. Risk assessment methods 
clearly show that rapid clearance of as few as 80 per-
cent of the mines in an area could halve the casual-
ties over the next 20 years compared with the cur-
rent near-perfect but very slow method [http://www. 
hdic.j m u .edu/hdic/journal/3. l /features/ risk_ brown/ 
risk_brown.htm]. The large decrease in civil ian ca-
sualties would be accompanied by a small increase in 
deminer casualties and that simply is not acceptable. 
In contrast to most trades, deminers must be able 
to use all their tools and equipment effectively from 
the first day they work in a live area. A humanitarian 
deminer cannot start as an apprentice with a few lim-
ited tools and skills and gradually increase both. 
Working alongside and watching an experienced 
deminer is also dangerous and unacceptable. It places 
a heavy demand on the des igners of tools and equip-
ment to avoid any operating methods that depend 
too heavily on detailed experience or having gradu-
ally learned a subtle feel or complex instructions. 
There are similar problems in the innovation 
process itself. Testing prototype demining equipment 
is nearly impossible. Prototype safety equipment, and 
demining cools that are not quire good enough yer, 
or maybe have hidden faults, cannot be tested thor-
oughly in live areas. This is becoming even more im-
portant as microprocessors start to be used in almost 
all metal detectors. The computer software char the 
microprocessors use cannot be exhaustively tested to 
prevent against all evemuali ties. Limited testing with 
surrogate mines is the best that can be done, but rests 
on a small number of items cannot guarantee ad-
equate performance under all circumstances. This is 
a strong argument in favor of improving existing tools 
that work well and abandoning work on very com-
plex new equipment no marrer how good it may 
promise to be. 
Much of what has been wrirren on "appropriate 
technology" deals with technologies for production. 
Humanitarian demining produces land that is free 
from mines. This view of demining as "producing" 
usable land can be helpful in looking at which tech-
nologies are likely co succeed. If a technology looks 
completely unsuitable for use in a production envi-
ronment in a factory in a particular mined country 
rhen it will probably nor be suitable for use in the 
field. Improved productivity (increase in area cleared 
per dollar) is a very important measure of demining 
equipment and has often been overlooked in research 
programs that choose instead increased sophistica-
tion. 
Technologies that function well in a laboratory 
may not be suitable for local deminers familiar with 
simpler methods such as manual prodding. If oper-
ating the equipment is confusing and complex, there 
is every reason for a deminer to fail to trust his or her 
own memory of how to use it. Local humanitarian 
deminers may choose to ignore advanced demining 
tools and continue to use trusted methods. Failure 
to remember the correct operating instructions could 
result in injury o r death. 
Some of the effects of making demining tech-
nology choices are a lot less obvious. For example, 
many mine field vegetation clearance machines can 
only work where there is good road access and where 
the site is reasonably level. In many countries the flat-
ter and more productive land, especially where there 
is good road access, is already owned by the richest 
fam ilies or the local war-lords. If me-
chanically assisted methods could be 
used to clear mines and UXO from 
only two-thirds of the agricultural 
land in a particular village a demining 
agency could well decide that the 
other third is "un economi cal" to clear. 
As is well known, humanitarian 
demining is not one single activity, 
nor is it done in the same way in dif-
ferent countries. Far too much high 
technology research has focussed on 
finding a single universal mine detec-
tor that will have a single operating 
procedure- this is a military require-
ment more than a humanitaria n 
demining requirement. Military mine 
field breaching and humanitarian land 
clearance by local people working for 
a demining organization are so differ-
ent that equipment suitable for one is 
generally not useful for the other. U n-
less the results of commercial de-
mining research are useful to the large 
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and lucrative mili-
tary marker it is 
difficult ro justify 
funding to pay for 
it. Humanitarian 
demining has been 
expected to benefit 
from spin-off from 
military research 
but this has been 
very limited. The 
cost and complex-
ity of military 
equipment and the mi litary breaching requirement 
for rapid detection even if small mines are occasion-
ally overlooked are not compatible with humanitar-
ian land clearance. C rucial decisions about humani-
tarian research program are taken by expert advisers 
who have a background in military engineering or ex-
plosive ordnance disposal. Inevitably, the equipment 
that is most familiar in presentation and function 
seems more attractive, at least initially. Hence there 
is a built-in bias in high-tech research towards equip-
ment sui table for military use. Instead of humanitar-
ian demining equipment benefiting from spending 
on military research the reverse has happened and the 
main beneficiaries of most 
humanitarian high-tech de-
mining research have been 
military deminers, in both 
their combat and peace-
keeping roles. 
The need for emer-
gency demining programs 
will continue, but humani-
tarian demining is already 
moving toward a different 
role, that of being a partner 
in long term development. 
Donor funding for humani-
tarian demining is starting 
to shrink, in the future more will have to be done with 
less funding and the cost-effective developmental 
approach will become more importanr. In emergency 
aid, the needs are acute so supplies, experts and tech-
nologies are parachuted in as fast as possible. In de-
velopment, hard lessons have convinced most people 
that the only way to get the right answers is a sound 
collaboration between local people- the insiders who 
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really understand the local problems-and outsiders 
who have specific expertise. There is a wealth of ex-
perience in managing this change from emergency 
response to development work in such areas as health 
care, water supply, low-cost housing and agriculture. 
Humanitarian demining organizations can benefit 
from the hindsight of other agencies and avoid re-
peating some of the painful mistakes that have been 
made in the last 20 years. Some aspects of develop-
mental work are already familiar to many demining 
organizations, for example: 
• Prioritizing needs. 
• Working within avai lable funds even when 
they are insufficient. 
• Building on existing knowledge and technolo-
gies instead of starting from scratch every time. 
• Including all the people who will benefit right 
from the beginning so that resources are not 
misused. 
Demining is in a leading position as many other 
development activities cannot start until the land is 
cleared, however it has similar requirements to any 
development work in needing the right tools and 
equipment. These must be: 
• Functional and reliable. 
• Affordable and good value. 
• What the user wants and can understand. 
• Suitable for local use exactly where they are 
needed. 
• Easy to maintain and repair. 
The need to develop new tools and techniques, 
not just select from a range of existing alternatives, 
imposes further restrictions. Engineering research can 
only be done effectively where there is access to fund-
ing, trained personnel, information, technical data, 
supplies of parts for building prototypes, workshops 
and test facilities. This inevitably means that Europe 
and North America dominate; the participation of 
professional researchers in mined countries is often 
underrated or ignored. 
Specialized research in the richest countries has 
led to remarkable advances such as computers and 
mobile phones, but it has also narrowed rhe think-
ing of many researchers to the point where the only 
way forward is increased complexity. In marketing 
terms, more features give the user more choice. By 
contrast, "Advanced Simplicity,'' the harnessing of the 
latest technology and thinking to make equipment 
simpler has generally been ignored. In demining re-
search, finding our what deminers in the field really 
want has all too often become a token exercise; a good 
understanding of field conditions can only be gained 
from visiting mined areas at every opportunity. For 
example, the many ideas for equipment that use a 
color-display computer screen to warn the operator 
of mines are doomed to fail in some countries. Not 
only are these screens unreadable in bright tropical 
sunlight, they currently have a limited temperature 
range, are expensive and fragile, and mean that the 
de miners must focus their visual attention away from 
the ground and vegetation that they are clearing. Yet 
in the lab they seem such a good idea. What is lack-
ing is the exchange of ideas between engineers, 
deminers and people who have experience of the 
problems of development. 
Some minimum standards for any new demining 
tool or equipment, in addition to the more general 
criteria above, are that ir: 
• Works in the lab to humanitarian demining 
specifications and continues to work when 
taken into the field. 
• Takes into account the realities of humanitar-
ian demining SOPs and the local 
deminers' knowledge. 
• Provides someth ing that deminers somewhere 
really need and actually want to use. 
• Enhances the demining process by making it 
faster, safer or cheaper. 
There are three well-tried ways of producing 
more effective rools: 
1) Design all-new tools. 
2) Upgrade traditional or existing tools, such as 
improving metal detectors. 
3) Scale down or adapt equipment from allied 
fields, like agricultural vegetation cutters. 
Research institutes and universities in Europe 
have generally concentrated on the first route at great 
cost and with little to show. Commercial companies 
and NGOs have sometimes followed the second route 
and made good progress. Some demining organiza-
tions and specialist NGOs have taken the third route 
and achieved some remarkable successes. 
It has become common to think that technologi-
cal solutions ro demining problems are difficult to 
achieve and require a lot of time and money. In fact 
the opposite is true. The record of individuals and 
organizations with few resources and tiny budgets 
making major improvements is quite outstanding. 
Successful vegetation clearance and building-rubble-
clearance equipment has been built by demining or-
ganizations for their own use from commercial off-
the-shelf components; visors and 
protective clothing are now made in 
several countries by local workshops 
and metal detectors are now better 
than a few years ago. In parallel, 
improved management and refined 
SOPs have led to a large increase in 
deminer efficiency and a reduction 
in accident rates. 
If we persist in spending vast 
sums of money tackling the wrong 
problems (e.g. detecting buried 
-·-
mines in level lawns), if we look only to technical 
experts with very narrow specializations and if we ig-
nore any development issues, then we can expect an-
other few years of fruitless effort and wasted money. 
The choice is clear. • 
*Opinions expressed are personal and not necessarily the 
views of the DTU of the University ofWarwick. 
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